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Abstract
The robustness of connectivity and the efficiency of paths are incompatible in many
real networks. We propose a self-organization mechanism for incrementally gener-
ating onion-like networks with positive degree-degree correlations whose robustness
is nearly optimal. As a spatial extension of the generation model based on coop-
erative copying and adding shortcut, we show that the growing networks become
more robust and efficient through enhancing the onion-like topological structure
on a space. The reasonable constraint for locating nodes on the perimeter in typ-
ical surface growth as a self-propagation does not affect these properties of the
tolerance and the path length. Moreover, the robustness can be recovered in the
random growth damaged by insistent sequential attacks even without any remedial
measures.
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1 Introduction
In modern society, our daily activities depend on energy supply, communi-
cation, transportation, economic, and ecological networks, however their in-
frastructure systems are complex and not constructed by a central control.
Unfortunately, natural and man-made disasters occur at many locations in
the world, sometimes they bring to the crises of such network infrastructures.
For the improvements with robust connectivity, it is expected to study the ad-
mirable self-organizations appeared in natural and social systems [1]. In par-
ticular, several fundamental mechanisms: preferential attachment [2], copying
[3,4], survival [5,6,7], subdivision (fragmentation) [8,9,10,11,12,13], or aggre-
gation [13,14] are attractive for generating networks in the interdisciplinary
research fields of physics, biology, sociology, and computer science.
With the break of complex network science in the beginning of 21st century, it
is well known that in many social, technological, and biological networks there
exists a common scale-free (SF) structure whose power-law degree distribution
is generated by the preferential attachment [2] likened to “rich-get-richer”
rule. The SF networks have the efficient small-world (SW) property [15] that
the path length counted by the hops through minimum intermediate nodes
between any two nodes is short even for a large network size, however they also
have an extreme vulnerability against intentional attacks in spite of having the
tolerance of connectivity against random failures [16]. The vulnerability comes
from a few existing of large degree hub nodes in a power-law distribution. Thus,
the efficiency of path and the robustness of connectivity are incompatible in
many real networks, such as Internet, power-grids, airline networks, metabolic
networks, and so on. If we do not persist the generation mechanism of real
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networks, we may find other more desirable mechanism to maintain both the
robustness and the efficiency.
Since the natural design methods are not limited to only the selfish rule for
a good network in efficiency, scalability, stability, adaptivity, or other criteria,
we consider a random copying process to generate complex networks as one of
other candidates for the design of future network infrastructure. We take into
account self-propagation in maintaining the robust network structure without
degrading the communication or transportation performance in the growth.
Although the duplication process has been so far considered to be fundamental
in a model of protein-protein interaction networks [3,4], its generation mech-
anism with some modifications may be applied to a self-organized design of
social and/or technological networks in urban planning, civil engineering, or
information system science.
On the other hand, by numerical and theoretical analysis, it has been shown
that [17,18,19] onion-like topological structure with positive degree-degree cor-
relations gives the optimal robustness against targeted attacks to hub nodes
in an SF network. For any degree distribution, the onion-like topology con-
sists of a core of highly connected nodes hierarchically surrounded by rings of
nodes with decreasing degree. In a related generation method in a family of
SF networks, a deterministic model called as mandala network that consist of
recurrently expanded intra- and inner-connections of ringed nodes has been
studied [20]; the robustness is improved by rewiring or adding links applied
to the outmost two rings of nodes from the core of connected hub nodes. Fur-
thermore, an efficient rewiring algorithm has been developed for generating
a network of onion-like topology with the nearly optimal robustness under
a given degree distribution [21]. However, these constructions are based on
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swapping endpoints of randomly chosen two links [17,18], expanding the rings
by simultaneously adding ni = 2ni−1 nodes for the i-th iterations [20], and
entirely rewiring of links [21] like a configuration model [22], an incremental
generation method was not found for the networks with onion-like topology.
Recently, an incrementally growing method of such networks with onion-like
topology has been proposed [23] as a modification of the duplication-divergence
(D-D) model [3,4] in enhancing the degree-degree correlations.
In this paper, we focus on a self-organized design for infrastructural communi-
cation and transportation network systems on a space, rather than the detail
technologies and facilities. In particular, we consider a spatial growth of net-
work with the robust onion-like topology. Although there are many types of
failures and attacks, e.g. locally spreading damages in a disaster, this paper
treats typical random and targeted removal of nodes for investigating the fun-
damental property of robustness. Instead, we take notice of the uncertainty:
whether the robust structure can be maintained or not in a spatial growing of
network, because the embedding on a space imposes some kind of constraints
on the construction of network topology. The organization of this paper is as
follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce a biologically inspired basic model [23] for gen-
erating onion-like topological structure with strong robustness. Without loss
of the robust onion-like topology, we extend it to spatial networks according to
surface growth. Such growth gives a hint for finding plausible self-propagation
mechanism in distributed network systems. In Sec. 3, we show good properties
for the robustness of connectivity and the efficiency of path on the growing
networks. In particular, it is attractive that the reasonable constraint on a
contact area of surface for locating nodes in the growth does not affect these
properties of robustness and efficiency. Moreover, we show the resilient connec-
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tivity. Even without any remedial measures, the robustness can be recovered
in the growth damaged by sequential attacks. Resilience [24] is an important
concept to heal over, repair, and recover the performance from a damaged
system, the recovery of robustness will give a first step to develop resilient
network systems. Some strategies for the resilient networks are discussed par-
ticularly in interdependent networks [25,26] recently. In Sec. 4, we summarize
these results, and mention several issues to make a more resilient network
system.
2 Spatially growing onion-like networks
2.1 Basic generation procedures
This subsection introduces a basic model of incrementally growing networks
with onion-like topology [23]. In the next subsection, we extend it to a spatial
model and explain how to locate a node on a space.
In the conventional D-D model [3,4], as the duplication process, a new node
added per time step links to connected neighbor nodes of a randomly cho-
sen node. Then deletion of the duplication links occurs with probability δ.
We modify the duplication process by non-trivial discovering ideas; the differ-
ences of our proposed network [23] from the D-D model are the adding of a
mutual link between new and randomly chosen nodes, and the simultaneous
progress of copying and adding shortcut links at a time-interval to enhance the
onion-like topological structure. We call the combination of a mutual link and
duplication links as copying. Shortcut means an analogy to random connec-
tions in the SW model [15]. The outline of network generation consists of (1)
5
At each time step, a new node is added at a position on a square lattice. (2)
As the copying process, the new node stochastically links to connected neigh-
bor nodes of a chosen node limited on the perimeter (surface) of a spatially
growing network. (3) In order to enhance the robustness of connectivity, we
consider having positive degree-degree correlations in the copying and adding
of shortcut links. These procedures are summarized as follows.
Step 0 Set an initial configuration of connected N0 nodes.
Step 1 At each time step t = 1, 2, . . ., a new node is added on a space. As
shown to the topological structure in Fig. 1(a), the new node i connects
to a randomly chosen node and to the neighbor nodes j with a probability
(1− δ)× p [21],
p
def
=
1
1 + a | ki − kj |
, (1)
where δ is a rate of link deletion, a ≥ 0 is a parameter, and ki and kj denote
the degrees of nodes i and j. Since the linking is a stochastic process for
the new node i, unknown ki in Eq.(1) is anticipatorily set as (1 − δ)× the
degree of the chosen node.
Step 2 Moreover, at every time-interval IT , shortcut links until the number
pscM(t) are added between randomly chosen nodes i and j according to
the probability of Eq.(1) in prohibiting self-loops at a node and duplicate
connections between two nodes 1 . Here, psc is a rate of adding shortcut
links, M(t) denotes the number of links in the network at that time t =
IT, 2IT, 3IT, . . ., and IT is defined by time steps greater than one.
Step 3 The above processes in Steps 1 and 2 are repeated up to a given size
N for N(t) = t+N0.
1 In the prohibitive case, selections of other nodes are tried in the same way.
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(a) Copying process
X
(b) Candidates of node’s location
Fig. 1. Basic topological and spatial processes. (a) Thick black and gray lines show
the generated links by the copying process. Then deletion of dashed line occurs
with probability δ × p. Thin lines show the already existing links. We remark that
such a bypath of nodes j’-i-j is created for the path of nodes j’-chosen-j. (b) Open
circles are selectable nodes, but one with cross mark is not. Shaded sites show the
perimeter as inserted locations of a new node.
We emphasize the following effects of copying and shortcut on the robustness.
• Local proxy function: by copying to make bypaths via another access point
of new node (see Fig. 1(a)) as a duplexing and the accumulated multiplexing
via other new nodes in the growth
• Complementary function: by adding shortcut links especially between small
degree (homophily) nodes to enhance the robustness
Note that the local redundancy with bypaths is often used in distributed
computer communication systems. Our generation method is based on a co-
operation mechanism that consists of the above functions and the linking of
similar degree nodes as homophily. Each part constructed by the copying and
adding shortcut links helps each other with the division of roles to be a ro-
bust network in taking into account positive degree-degree correlations. More
precisely, we explain the roles as follows. Since the double random selections
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for the neighbor nodes j contribute to an equivalent effect of preferential at-
tachment [27,28], large degree nodes i and j tend to be connected together
when the chosen node has a large degree. However, such positive correlations
between small degree nodes are weak in the tree-like structure generated by
only the copying process [23]. Thus, in order to make an onion-like topological
structure, we further consider addition of shortcut links [15] between ran-
domly chosen nodes i and j with the probability of Eq.(1). The adding per
a time-interval IT instead of each time step is considered as non-dominant
(complementary) but necessary process for generating an onion-like topology.
It has already been shown that adding some shortcut links between randomly
chosen nodes improves the robustness in the theory for the small-world model
[29] and also in the numerical simulations for geographical networks: ran-
dom Apollonian networks [30], multi-scale quartered networks [31], and link
survival networks [7]. In addition, positive degree-degree correlations tend to
appear in randomly growing networks [32]. Therefore, in our network grown
by the simultaneous progress of the copying and adding shortcut links, it
is expected that the robustness becomes stronger due to enhancing positive
degree-degree correlations for emerging the onion-like topology.
2.2 Spatial networks generated by surface growth with robustness
In this subsection, we explain how to locate a new node in the network ac-
cording to typical models of surface growth.
There exist many complex pattern-formations far from equilibrium in nature
[33] as living open systems. Several models of fractal growing random pattern
have been studied for the growth of biological cell colonies, fluid displacing in
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a porous medium, dendritic solidification, dielectric breakdown, snowflake for-
mation, and bacterial colonies [33,34]. Some most important classes of surface
growth include Diffusion-Limited Aggregation (DLA) [35,36], Invasion Per-
colation (IP) [37], and Eden growth [38], which can be used as a basis for
understanding a wide range of pattern-formation phenomena with disorderly
growth.
Thus, we consider diffusively growing networks on surface with both onion-like
topological and fractal spatial structures. In our network, the position of new
node is determined by DLA, IP, and Eden models on a square lattice. Exactly,
only DLA and IP models at the critical threshold generate a fractal structure.
These models have the following processes [33] and explanations to give a new
insight of the self-organized design of spatial network.
DLA model As an idealization of the irreversible aggregation, the following
process forms a growing diffusive cluster. It is motivated from several phe-
nomena of biological interest for the surface growth with complicated shape,
which corresponds to a distributed local extension of technological or social
network system.
The initial configuration is a single occupied site on a lattice. At each gen-
eration step, the cluster of occupied sites is grown by launching a random
walker from outside of the occupied region, and allowing it to its random
walk path until it reaches a site that is adjacent to the occupied site. The
process is repeated with a new random walker.
IP model It is based on a transport process by the slow displacement of a
wetting fluid in a porous media. The percolation growth corresponds to an
extension in avoiding geographical obstacles engraved by longstanding rains
and winds for the network construction.
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Initially, random numbers or thresholds are assigned to the sites of a lattice.
They represent the capillary pressures for penetrating through the porous
medium or the difficulties (low priorities) to install network connections on
a geographical space. At each generation step, an unoccupied site with the
lowest threshold (smallest random number, highest priority) is selected as
an injection point on the perimeter, and occupied. Such process is repeated.
Eden model It imitates a cell division process, which corresponds to the
most local extension to neighbor space in a simple way.
Starting with an occupied cell (site), an occupied cell on the perimeter of
the cluster is randomly selected with equal probability. One of its nearest
neighbor unoccupied perimeter cell is selected and occupied. The cluster is
grown by adding the selected nearest neighbor at each generation step. Such
process is repeated for a new selection of cell with the division.
As a constraint in the surface growth, the inserted position of new node is
limited on the perimeter of connected cluster. Figure 1(b) shows that the in-
ternal node(s) marked by × can’t be selected, since the only neighbors marked
by © of shaded positions are the candidates. In other words, the selection of
a node is not uniformly at random (u.a.r) in the growing network. However,
the limitation is rather reasonable, since the perimeter is a contact area from
the outer world into the network through the growth. Moreover, although
u.a.r selection is not equivalent to independent one, the perimeter sites can
grow simultaneously in distributed processes on several places. These sites
autonomously perform the processes initiated by diffusive growing, own local
timers corresponded to thresholds 2 , or random numbers. It is an important
2 The threshold may be related to the amount of potential communication or trans-
portation requests which are proportional to a population density.
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(a) DLA Model: δ = 0.3, psc = 0.015
(b) IP Model: δ = 0.3, psc = 0.013
(c) Eden Model: δ = 0.3, psc = 0.009
Fig. 2. (Color online) Growing spatial networks for N(t) = 200, 500, 1000 and 2000
from left to right with arranged scales. Gradually colored node is according to its
degree: 1-3(cyan), 4-6(blue), 7-9(green), 10-12(magenta), and the larger(red).
discussion point in this paper whether the constraint on the surface growth
hardly affect the emergence of an onion-like topological structure.
Typical shapes of the growing spatial networks are shown in Fig. 2. These
models form (a) dendritic, (b) porous, and (c) compact patterns, respectively,
on a square lattice. Large degree (magenta and red) nodes are spontaneously
interspersed in constructing densely connected parts. The rate psc of adding
shortcut links is regulated to be a same condition of the connection density
as 〈k〉 ≈ 5.6 at N = 2000 in all models. We also set initial complete graph
of N0 = 4, IT = 50, and a = 0.3. Since we want to investigate the effect
of the copying process with adding shortcut links on the robustness and the
efficiency, we use a small value of a which is different from 3.0 in the rewiring
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algorithm [21]. Too large value of a restricts linking in the copying process,
only the mutual link may be remained at each time step in the growing. This
point will be mentioned again in subsection 3.1.
Figures 3(a)-(c) show the degree distributions in the onion-like networks ac-
cording to DLA, IP, and Eden models. We remark that the largest degree kmax
is bounded around 20 with the exponential tail for N = 2000 (see Inset). The
load at a node for maintaining links becomes smaller than that in SF net-
works, since there is no huge hubs. We compare Figs. 3(a)-(c) with the result
for the previous generation method of spatial growing networks [23] without
the constraint in the surface growth, in which a new node is located on random
radius between rmin and rmax with a random direction [39] from the position
of a uniformly randomly chosen node in order to make proximity connections
heuristically. Figure 3(d) shows the distribution with slightly larger kmax but
the exponential tail is more clear in the spatial growing networks without the
constraint in the surface growth. The smaller kmax in Fig 3(a)-(c) is probably
caused by the constraint.
We shows the average degree 〈knn〉 of the nearest neighbor nodes of node
with degree k in Fig. 4. The increasing slope represents positive degree-degree
correlations which are necessary to be onion-like topology. The drops in k ≥ 15
are ignorable because of finite-size effect (see the tails of p(k) in Fig. 3). Note
that the case of δ = 0.1 has also positive degree-degree correlations in spite
of the tree-like structure without onion-like topology. From top to bottom
in Fig. 5, we show examples of tree-like and onion-like topological structures
visualized by Pajek [40] in ignoring the spatial positions of nodes on the surface
growth. In particular, from the 2nd row to the bottom for δ = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7,
and 0.9, high degree nodes concentrate on the center area while low degree
12
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(d) Spatial growing model
Fig. 3. (Color online) Degree distribution in the networks according to (a) DLA, (b)
IP, (c) Eden, and (d) Spatial growing models for N = 2000 with 〈k〉 ≈ 5.6. Inset
shows the exponential decay of tail part approximated by a straight line in semi-log
plot. These results are averaged over 100 samples.
nodes surround them.
3 Robustness and efficiency on the growing networks
We investigate the robustness against random failures and malicious attacks
in subsection 3.1, the growing behavior in subsection 3.2, and the efficiency
of path in subsection 3.3. In the malicious attack, nodes are removed in de-
creasing order of the current degrees through the recalculations [41]. We also
discuss the resilience against sequential attacks in subsection 3.4.
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(c) Eden model
Fig. 4. (Color online) Distribution of the average degree 〈knn〉 of the nearest neighbor
nodes of node with degree k in the networks according to (a) DLA, (b) IP, and (c)
Eden models from left to right for N = 2000 with 〈k〉 ≈ 5.6. Positive degree-degree
correlations appear except the tails with finite-size effect in all cases. These results
are averaged over 100 samples.
3.1 Robustness of connectivity on the growing networks
We consider following two measures for the robustness of connectivity and the
degree-degree correlation in a network. For the robustness, we investigate an
index [17,18,21]:
R =
1
N
1∑
q=1/N
S(q), (2)
where S(q) denotes the number of nodes in the giant component (GC: largest
connected cluster) after removing qN nodes, q is a fraction of removed nodes
by random failures or malicious attacks. The range of R is [0, 0.5], where R = 0
corresponds to a completely disconnected network consisting of isolated nodes,
and R = 0.5 corresponds to the most robust network. As a measure of degree-
degree correlation, we investigate the assortativity [42,43]
r =
S1Se − S
2
2
S1S3 − S22
,
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(a) DLA model (b) IP model (c) Eden model
Fig. 5. Visualization of the topological structures of the networks according to (a)
DLA, (b) IP, and (c) Eden models from left to right. A tree-like structure appears at
the top for δ = 0.1, in otherwise onion-like structures with a core area of high degree
nodes surrounded by low degree nodes appear from the 2nd row to the bottom for
δ = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. The node size is proportional to its degree.
where S1 =
∑
i ki, S2 =
∑
i k
2
i S3 =
∑
i k
3
i , Se =
∑
ij Aijkikj, Aij denotes
the i-j element of the adjacency matrix. The range of r is [−1, 1] as the
Pearson correlation coefficient for degrees. Nodes with similar degrees tend to
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be connected as r > 0 is larger. Note that onion structure and assortativeness
with a large r > 0 are distinct properties [17]: Not all assortative networks
have onion structure but all onion networks are assortative [21]. Therefore,
the value of r > 0 is relatively large in an onion-like network.
Table 1 shows the average values over 100 samples for our networks with
a = 0.3 in the 4-6th columns and the corresponding rewired version recon-
structed by Wu and Holme’s algorithm [21] with a = 3.0 in the 7-9th columns.
R:failures andR:attacks denote the robustness index defined by Eq. (2) against
random failures and malicious attacks, respectively. Note that the rate psc of
adding shortcut links is regulated to be 〈k〉 ≈ 5.6 with a same connection
density. We remark that, with higher values of R, the robustness is improved
from the tree-like network generated by only the copying process for δ = 0.1 to
the networks for δ = 0.3 ∼ 0.9. These networks have an onion-like topological
structure with high assortativity r, since the values of R are slightly smaller
but almost coincide with R = 0.436 ∼ 0.444 against random failures and
R = 0.307 ∼ 0.326 against malicious attacks in the rewired version [21] to be
an onion-like network with the nearly optimal robustness. Although the assor-
tativity r in the rewired version becomes larger in all cases, the improvement
on the robustness from our networks is small. Table 2 shows the results for
comparison between the cases of a = 0.3 and a = 3.0. In order to be 〈k〉 ≈ 5.6
in the case of a = 3.0, larger rates psc are necessary especially for large rates
δ of deletion. The setting of psc means that the effect of the copying process
becomes very weak within limited strong degree-degree correlations, because
almost all of duplication links are failed as deletion at each time step as similar
to the case of δ = 0.9. Not surprisingly, a larger assortativity r is obtained in
Table 2 because of stronger degree-degree correlations by larger a than that
16
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Fig. 6. (Color online) Robustness against (a)(c) malicious attacks and (b)(d) random
failures in the networks according to DLA model for N = 2000 with 〈k〉 ≈ 5.6.
The top:(a)(b) shows the relative size S(q)/N of the giant component (GC) versus
fraction q of removed nodes, and the bottom:(c)(d) shows the average size 〈s(q)〉
of isolated clusters except the GC. Similar graphs are obtained for IP and Eden
models.
for each corresponding case in Table 1. However, the value of robustness index
R in Table 2 is at a same level as that for each corresponding case in Table
1. There are no notable differences among these results for DLA, IP, Eden
models from top to bottom in both Tables. Thus, the setting of a = 0.3 does
not lose the intrinsic property for the robustness in our networks, moreover
the effect of the copying process remains.
In the following until the end of next section, we set a = 0.3 unless otherwise
noted. Figure 6 shows typical results of the robustness. Inset (cyan line) shows
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Fig. 7. (Color online) Time-courses of assortativity r, average degree 〈k〉, robust-
ness index R against the malicious attacks in the growing networks according to
(top) DLA, (middle) IP, (bottom) Eden models for the size N(t). These results are
averaged over 100 samples.
the vulnerability in the case of tree-like networks for δ = 0.1. Note that the
value of R defined by Eq.(2) corresponds to the area under the line of S(q)/N .
The peak of 〈s〉 corresponds to the critical point qc at the breaking of the GC
(dropping point of S(q)/N). Although a larger qc indicates a more robust
network, R is generally a more precise index than qc. Because different values
of R can exist for a same value of qc depending on the steepness of dropping
curve of S(q)/N .
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3.2 Growing behavior
We investigate the growing behavior of our proposed networks. In Fig. 7 left,
middle, and right, for the time-courses of assortativity r, average degree 〈k〉,
and robustness index R, we obtain similar results in the networks according
to DLA, IP, and Eden models. They are consistent with the behavior in the
spatially growing model [23] without the constraint in the surface growth. As
shown at the left of Fig. 7 top, middle, and bottom, r is almost constant
through the growing except the cases of δ = 0.7 and 0.9 denoted by dashed
(blue) and dotted (magenta) lines. At the middle column of Fig. 7 top, middle,
and bottom, 〈k〉 increases for the the growing size N(t) = t + 4. The slope
(increasing rate) becomes steeper as the deletion rate δ is larger. At the right
of Fig. 7 top, middle, and bottom, while R also increases in the simultaneous
progress of the copying and adding shortcut links, it decreases in the cases
of δ = 0.1 without shortcuts in the tree-like network denoted by the dashed
(cyan) lines. In general, larger 〈k〉 with more links tends to lead to higher
robustness. Indeed, the increasing of 〈k〉 corresponds to the increasing of R in
Fig. 7 top, middle, and bottom. Note that the decrease of R in the first stage
of small N(t) is due to the tree-like structure before shaping an onion-like
topological structure. Thus, our proposed networks become more robust in
the growth with the enhancement of onion-like topology. We remark that the
case of δ = 0.1 seems to be good with high R in the first stage of small N(t)
while the cases of δ = 0.7 and 0.9 (blue and magenta lines) seem to be good
with larger increasing around the last stage of large N(t). The case of δ = 0.3
(red line) is comparatively stable with smaller fluctuation in the entire stage.
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Fig. 8. (Color online) Rank plot of link lengths measured by the Euclidean distance
in the networks for N = 2000 with 〈k〉 ≈ 5.6. These results are averaged over 100
samples.
3.3 Efficiency of path on the growing networks
Next, we investigate the communication or transportation efficiency in the
growing networks. Obviously, shorter links and paths are better with both
less construction and maintenance costs. Figure 8 shows the rank plot of link
lengths. The order of shorter links is (c) Eden model < (b) IP model < (a)
DLA model < (d) Spatial growing model [23] without the constraint in the
surface growth, however the difference between (b) and (a) is very small. This
order of link lengths is reasonable because Eden model tends to be compact
while IP model tends to percolate making some holes as porous structure and
DLA model tends to spread widely along dendritic edges. The tops of Figs. 9,
10, and 11 show the average path length 〈Lij〉 counted by hops between two
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Fig. 9. (Color online) Average path length 〈Lij〉 counted by hops (top:(a)(b)) and
the average distance 〈Dij〉 measured by Euclidean distance (bottom:(c)(d)) in the
growing networks according to DLA model. The left:(a)(c) and right:(b)(d) show
the results for the minimum hop paths and the shortest distance paths between two
nodes, respectively. These results are averaged over 100 samples.
nodes on the paths of (left) minimum hop and (right) shortest distance. We
obtain in the tree-like networks (cyan line) monotone increasing curves, while
in the onion-like networks (other color lines) convex curves with up-down,
whose parts in decreasing the number of hops on both paths are related to
the increasing of 〈k〉 with more links as shown at the middle column of Fig.
7. It is remarkable that almost constant path length even for the growing size
is better than O(logN) of the SW property.
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Fig. 10. (Color online) Average path length 〈Lij〉 counted by hops (top:(a)(b)) and
the distance 〈Dij〉 measured by Euclidean distance (bottom:(c)(d)) in the growing
networks according to IP model. The left:(a)(c) and right:(b)(d) show the results
for the minimum hop paths and the shortest distance paths between two nodes,
respectively. These results are averaged over 100 samples.
The bottoms of Figs. 9, 10, and 11 show the average path distance 〈Dij〉
measured by the sum of link lengths as Euclidean distances on the paths of
(left) minimum hop and (right) shortest distance. We remark that evident
difference does not appear in 〈Dij〉 for varying δ in each of Figs. 9, 10, and 11
except the tree-like networks for δ = 0.1 (cyan line).
The orders of efficient shorter paths are Fig. 11: Eden model < Fig. 10: IP
model < Fig. 9: DLA model in the measures of both 〈Lij〉 and 〈Dij〉, however
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Fig. 11. (Color online) Average path length 〈Lij〉 counted by hops (top:(a)(b)) and
the distance 〈Dij〉 measured by Euclidean distance (bottom:(c)(d)) in the growing
network according to Eden model. The left:(a)(c) and right:(b)(d) show the results
for the minimum hop paths and the shortest distance paths between two nodes,
respectively. These results are averaged over 100 samples.
the difference among them is small especially in 〈Lij〉 for δ = 0.3 ∼ 0.9. In
addition, all of them in Figs. 9, 10, and 11 slightly deviate from straight lines
of O(logN) in semi-log plot as the SW property, although the SW property
is obtained in the spatial growing networks [23] without the constraint in
the surface growth. Thus, our proposed networks are efficient because the
increasing rates of the average path lengths and distances are suppressed in
the growing size. Note that the length 〈Lij〉 on the minimum hop path (left)
is shorter than that on the shortest distance path (right), while the distance
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〈Dij〉 on the minimum hop path (left) is longer than that on the shortest
distance path (right), in each figure.
3.4 Resilient connectivity against sequential attacks
Through this paper, we discuss dynamics of network configuration itself at
the most basic infrastructure for communication or transportation systems,
in which temporal and/or fixed (corresponding to wireless and/or wired) con-
nections are possible depending on the time-scale for changing the connection
structure in a network. The quick change results in ad hoc networks, while
the slow change is treated as an incremental modification of network. Both
cases and the mixed one are not excluded, however we have assumed that each
node or link is persisted once it is added unless removed by failures or attacks
to simplify the discussion. While other dynamics of information flows, rumor
spreading, opinion formation, synchronization, or logistics on a network, is
significant for applications in wireless, sensor, mobile communication systems
or autonomous transportation systems, in which operation protocols for birth
and death of communication or transportation request, routing, avoidance of
congestion, task allocation, queuing, awareness of location, monitoring of sys-
tem’s states or conditions, and so on [44], are necessary. We have pointed out
the issues of rethinking packet generation according to population, decentral-
ized routing strategy, and link hierarchy among long and short ranges with
high and low transfer speeds [45] in the state-of-the-art network technologies.
In addition, although several models have been proposed for the coevolution of
network formation and opinion spreading [46,47] and for the coupled dynam-
ics with network evolution and packet flows [6,7,48,49,50], they are beyond
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our current scope because of more complex dynamics between network gen-
eration and information flow in various protocols, device technologies, users,
and situations of utilization.
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Fig. 12. (Color online) Time-courses of assortativity r, average degree 〈k〉, robustness
index R against the malicious attacks in the networks damaged by sequential attacks
at every 10 time steps. These results are averaged over 100 samples according to
(top) DLA, (middle) IP, (bottom) Eden models.
On the other hand, we consider an interaction of network generation with
a change of environment, especially in sequential attacks. We show that our
proposed networks have resilient connectivity even in the previously described
growing scheme of constant δ, psc, and IT , without any remedial measures for
insistent attacks. Figure 12 shows the time-courses of r, 〈k〉, and R against
the further attacks in the networks damaged by sequential attacks. We set
the same values of δ, psc, and IT in the previous subsection, and the largest
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degree node with its links is removed through the recalculation of degrees at
every 10 time steps. At the left of Fig. 12 top, middle, and bottom for DLA,
IP, and Eden models, respectively, the damaged networks by the sequential
attacks have positive degree-degree correlations around r ≈ 0.2 somehow or
other. At the middle and right of Fig. 12, the robustness is recovered with
slowly increasing 〈k〉, since R is decreasing in the first stage of small N(t) but
increasing after a time. We obtain similar behavior in these spatial growth
models as shown in Fig. 12 from top to bottom, and the case of δ = 0.3
(red line) with the stronger effect of the copying is better than other cases of
δ = 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9 (green, blue, and magenta lines). In particular, in the
case of δ = 0.9 (magenta line), R does not increase until N(t) ≈ 500 due
to the insistent attacks. All values of r, 〈k〉, and R in Fig. 12 are smaller,
as compared with the results for the pure growing networks in Fig. 7. Thus,
even the damaged networks maintain the robust onion-like topology in the
growing scheme. We remark that in the sequential attacks the robustness is
protected locally by the copying, and enhanced globally in connecting isolated
clusters by adding shortcut links between randomly chosen nodes. Remember
the local proxy and complementary functions in subsection 2.1. When more
severe attacks in shorter interval at every 5 time steps are given, around the
robustness index R ≈ 0.15 ∼ 0.2 against the further attacks, the networks
no longer have an onion-like topological structure because of the assortativity
r ≈ 0.0 or r < 0.0 in this growing scheme of constant δ, psc, and IT without
any remedial measures.
26
4 Conclusion
We have proposed a spatial design method of robust and efficient networks
with typical surface growth patterns. It is self-organized through the simul-
taneous progress of the copying and adding shortcut links [23] taking into
account linking homophily to make an onion-like topological structure with
positive degree-degree correlations. For the copying, the selection of node is
not uniformly at random but limited to the neighbors of the perimeter of con-
nected cluster in the growing network on a space. In spite of the constraint
on the surface growth, we have obtained that the robustness against random
failures and malicious attacks is nearly optimal of slightly weaker than the
entirely rewired version [21]. Moreover, the efficiency of path measured in the
hop count is better than O(logN) of the SW property but one measured in
the Euclidean distance slightly degraded from the SW property. In particular,
the growing network becomes more robust and efficient in time-course. How-
ever, we may have to consider a resource allocation problem for the increasing
of 〈k〉 required with more links. On the other hand, we have also found that
there are no huge hubs bounded by an exponential tail of degree distribution,
and that large degree nodes are spontaneously interspersed on a space.
Moreover, we have shown that the robust onion-like topological structure re-
mains even in the random growth damaged by the sequential attacks. When a
node is removed by serious disasters or insistent attacks, more effective strate-
gies than a constant random growth can be considered to repair the damaged
parts. If a new node is added near the removed node as the proxy of it instead
of the random location on a neighbor site on the perimeter in the surface
growth, the network is probably more effectively healed over. If the parame-
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ters of δ, psc, and IT are regulated according to the damages, the network is
recovered to the original level of performance for the communication or the
transportation. These trials will require further study with healing and recov-
ering processes, e.g. we should consider which parts of network have priorities
to prevent spreading damages in topological and spatial importance. In a re-
alistic situation such as disaster or battle-field, resources for the strategies are
limited and should be allocated effectively in the priorities.
In summary, our growing network models suggest that robust and efficient
onion-like topological structure can emerge even when the positions of nodes
are limited in the contact area of the spatial network. In the cooperative
growing mechanism, the local proxy and complementary robust functions by
the copying and adding shortcut links will be useful for temporal evolution of
resilient network and a repair strategy in large-scale disasters or system crises.
However, it is an issue in general what type of constraint for locating nodes
on a space is an obstacle to the emergence of onion-like topology. It may be
related to limited facilities from geographical and economical viewpoints.
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Table 1
Average values over 100 samples in the networks for N = 2000 on the surface growth
according to DLA, IP, and Eden models from top to bottom. The 4-6th columns
show the results for our networks with a = 0.3, and the 7-9th columns show the
results for the corresponding rewired version [21] with a = 3.0 from our networks
with a = 0.3.
DLA our networks with a = 0.3 rewired version with a = 3.0
δ psc 〈k〉 r R:failures R:attacks r R:failures R:attacks
0.1 0.0 5.663790 0.428085 0.11414846 0.08546072 0.570401 0.44257568 0.32097051
0.3 0.015 5.693130 0.306182 0.42286182 0.27909878 0.563234 0.44446583 0.32624905
0.5 0.026 5.683880 0.315288 0.43330392 0.28798839 0.566574 0.44266511 0.32195528
0.7 0.035 5.560350 0.317886 0.43543737 0.28620190 0.568082 0.43890241 0.31470397
0.9 0.042 5.592120 0.321879 0.43776842 0.28822588 0.573602 0.43836274 0.31299371
IP our networks with a = 0.3 rewired version with a = 3.0
δ psc 〈k〉 r R:failures R:attacks r R:failures R:attacks
0.1 0.0 5.980630 0.394308 0.11528832 0.08374447 0.577101 0.44597737 0.32535835
0.3 0.013 5.656150 0.277479 0.41909362 0.27702885 0.561372 0.44345529 0.32521399
0.5 0.025 5.691770 0.289450 0.4337521 0.28823022 0.569636 0.44294242 0.32367072
0.7 0.035 5.616860 0.301741 0.43641043 0.28870629 0.574130 0.44029968 0.31788086
0.9 0.042 5.606670 0.305765 0.43796751 0.28855921 0.571790 0.43886147 0.31492539
Eden our networks with a = 0.3 rewired version with a = 3.0
δ psc 〈k〉 r R:failures R:attacks r R:failures R:attacks
0.1 0.0 6.644020 0.420114 0.19868989 0.11501878 0.600332 0.45091269 0.33193373
0.3 0.009 5.635930 0.304668 0.41034536 0.25781734 0.567774 0.439060744 0.31314427
0.5 0.022 5.648480 0.285373 0.43086621 0.27727353 0.568454 0.43895619 0.31237012
0.7 0.034 5.657810 0.283205 0.43680778 0.28117685 0.572352 0.43777281 0.30982738
0.9 0.042 5.658680 0.290042 0.43891585 0.28344713 0.566763 0.43673314 0.30796406
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Table 2
Average values over 100 samples in the networks for N = 2000 on the surface growth
according to DLA, IP, and Eden models from top to bottom. The 4-6th columns
show the results for comparison between the cases of a = 0.3 and a = 3.0 that is
different parameter setting form Table 1, and the 7-9th columns show the results for
the corresponding rewired version [21] with a = 3.0 from our networks with a = 3.0.
DLA our networks with a = 3.0 rewired version with a = 3.0
δ psc 〈k〉 r R:failures R:attacks r R:failures R:attacks
0.1 0.0 2.834040 0.437167 0.04345627 0.03607689 0.437008 0.32199987 0.18107685
0.3 0.035 5.650160 0.457448 0.43313566 0.2979080 0.583822 0.43888272 0.31681199
0.5 0.039 5.629190 0.457572 0.43389278 0.29740136 0.579910 0.43849948 0.31413023
0.7 0.043 5.594100 0.453034 0.43468667 0.29602458 0.585048 0.43675333 0.31164826
0.9 0.045 5.651210 0.454004 0.43586855 0.29712904 0.582588 0.43772334 0.31261318
IP our networks with a = 3.0 rewired version with a = 3.0
δ psc 〈k〉 r R:failures R:attacks r R:failures R:attacks
0.1 0.0 2.970500 0.400235 0.04522621 0.03565373 0.435406 0.33601715 0.19365666
0.3 0.034 5.635630 0.436601 0.43351504 0.29754534 0.581092 0.43953115 0.31804051
0.5 0.038 5.561670 0.430161 0.43346665 0.29522308 0.582158 0.43758882 0.3138613
0.7 0.043 5.601620 0.430950 0.4351622 0.29589068 0.582668 0.43698282 0.31191742
0.9 0.045 5.662410 0.437168 0.43656923 0.2982953 0.585400 0.43781393 0.31344812
Eden our networks with a = 3.0 rewired version with a = 3.0
δ psc 〈k〉 r R:failures R:attacks r R:failures R:attacks
0.1 0.0 3.167770 0.384913 0.07280454 0.0402646 0.445969 0.35275171 0.19681491
0.3 0.032 5.666700 0.425713 0.43319376 0.29233634 0.580907 0.43759013 0.31193571
0.5 0.037 5.629740 0.422828 0.4342548 0.29071317 0.582505 0.43608627 0.3089480
0.7 0.043 5.663520 0.419765 0.43617703 0.29168745 0.582820 0.43608627 0.30800115
0.9 0.045 5.664820 0.420572 0.43666387 0.2916347 0.579751 0.43535101 0.30689578
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